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I Comment I
U.N. Peacekeeping After Rwanda: Lessons
Learned or Mistakes Forgotten?
Crystal Faggart*
I. INTRODUCTION
The United Nations ("U.N.") has a history of operating as a
peacekeeping force around the world during times of conflict or
transition.1 Often, the states that receive U.N. assistance are under-
developed, and their citizens become greatly dependent upon the lofty
promises of the U.N.2  Therefore, when the U.N. is unable to uphold
these promises, or makes significant mistakes through the course of its
efforts, the results can be devastating. With a lengthy resume of
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University, May 2009; Bachelor of Arts in Psychology, The University of North Carolina
at Wilmington, May 2002. I would like to express my sincerest thanks to my family and
friends for their unfaltering love and support throughout my every endeavor. They have
instilled in me the courage to shoot for my dreams. Further, I would like to convey my
utmost gratitude to Nicholas Palmer for his support and encouragement during the
writing of this Comment.
1. See U.N. Dep't of Pub. Info., U.N. Peacekeeping Operations Background Note:
31 August 2008, DPI/1634/Rev. 87 (Sept. 2007), available at http://www.un.org/Depts/
dpko/dpko/archive/2008/bn0808e.pdf.
2. See id.
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peacekeeping missions, 3 one would think that the U.N. sits in an optimal
position to understand the needs of relevant parties during times of
conflict as well as its own capabilities in meeting these needs. By
analyzing the mistakes made in previous efforts, the U.N. can learn from
the past. However, it must be asked if the U.N. is indeed educating itself
in such a manner, or if instead it is continuing to offer empty promises to
nations in desperate need of reliable support.
This Comment seeks to answer these questions by comparing the
U.N.'s peacekeeping efforts during the 1994 Rwandan genocide with its
present efforts in Darfur. This Comment will begin by exploring the
historical development of the Rwandan genocide,4 followed by an
analysis of the U.N.'s response.5 Next, problems with the U.N.'s
approach in Rwanda will be identified.6 This Comment will then provide
a background to the present conflict in Darfur, Sudan.7 After noting that
the U.N.'s efforts in Darfur are beginning to mirror its efforts in Rwanda,
this section concludes by revealing that, without additional efforts, many
lives are at risk.8 Finally, the Comment ends with suggestions for the
U.N. to avoid the disastrous outcome that took place in Rwanda. 9
II. THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE
The conflict in Rwanda was the culmination of over a century of
struggles between two main ethnic groups, the Hutu and the Tutsi.' °
Beginning in April 1994, approximately 800,000 men, women, and
children were systematically slaughtered over the course of 100 days.11
According to the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide, 12 the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
determined that the mass killings of Tutsi by Hutu extremists constituted
genocide. 13
3. See id.
4. See infra notes 14-82 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 112-42 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 143-73 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 174-244 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 245-85 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 286-94 and accompanying text.
10. See International Panel of Eminent Personalities: Report on the 1994 Genocide
in Rwanda and Surrounding Events, 40 I.L.M. 141, 142 (Jan. 2001) [hereinafter IPEP].
11. See U.N. Sec. Council, Report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the
United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, p. 3, U.N. Doc. S/1999/1257 (Dec.
16, 1999) [hereinafter Rwanda Independent Inquiry].
12. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
13. See Rwanda Independent Inquiry, supra note 11.
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A. Historical Background of Rwandan Genocide
Throughout Rwanda's history, three central elements cultivated the
tense atmosphere which resulted in the genocide. 14 The country was
wracked with poverty and areas of over-population. 15  Prior to the
genocide, the population density within Rwanda was higher than any
other country in Africa. 16 On average there were 405 people per square
kilometer of usable land, and in the most populated areas there were over
820 people per square kilometer.' 7 Rwanda's history of authoritarian
rule was another contributing factor. 18 The final contributor was the
ethnic divide between Hutu and Tutsi.19
1. Ethnic Divide: Pre-colonial Era
The Hutu first arrived in present day Rwanda around approximately
1000 AD. 20 Agriculture was the Hutu's primary means of sustenance. 2'
Between the Eleventh and Fifteenth Centuries, the Tutsi began to
22 2populate the area, migrating from Ethiopia.23 The initial integration of
Hutu and Tutsi was predominately characterized by a mutually beneficial
trade relationship.24 The Tutsi were in need of Hutu agricultural
products while the Hutu benefited from the Tutsi's cattle products.25
However, tribal clashes began as early as the Fifteenth Century, when the
Tutsi sought to impose their system of governance over the Hutu.26 The
Tutsi gained political control by the middle of the Eighteenth Century,
though this resulted in little ethnic tension as the Tutsi had successfully
assimilated with the Hutu.27 Ethnicity did not begin to play a factor until
the Tutsi started to expand their control.28
14. See Joel Stettenheim, The Arusha Accords and the Failure of International
Intervention in Rwanda, in WORDS OVER WAR: MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION TO
PREVENT DEADLY CONFLICT 213, 216 (Melanie C. Greenburg et al. eds., 2000).
15. See id.
16. See id. at 217.
17. See id.
18. Seeid. at216.
19. See Stettenheim, supra note 14, at 216.
20. See id. at 218.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See Jerry Gray, 2 Nations Joined by Common History of Genocide, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 9, 1994, at 6.
24. See Stettenheim, supra note 14, at 218.
25. See id.
26. See Gray, supra note 23.
27. See Stettenheim, supra note 14, at 218.
28. See id.
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It was from 1860 to 1895, during the reign of Tutsi King Rwabugiri,
that ethnicity was brought to the forefront. 29 King Rwabugiri extended
Tutsi rule throughout most of the country with the creation of an efficient
and centralized administration.30 This feudal system created a cultural
structure where Tutsi typically had higher status than Hutu. 3 1 "During
this period, the Tutsi elites who held all the highest positions of power
almost certainly began to associate their status and privilege with their
Tutsi 'ethnicity.' At the middle-level and lower ranks of the social
structure, however, 'ethnicity' was simply one factor in determining an
individual's social stature. 32
2. German Colonization and Belgian Trusteeship
Germany colonized Rwanda from 1884 to 1916.33 During this
colonial period, the German rulers allied with the Tutsi, though they
comprised only fourteen percent of the population compared to the
eighty-five percent Hutu majority. 34 After this period, the League of
Nations placed Rwanda under Belgian trusteeship until 1962, when
Rwanda regained its independence.
35
During the time of colonization, Rwanda's feudal structure was
converted into a much more inflexible system of Tutsi rule and an
ideology of ethnic divide was magnified.36 Although the disparities
between the Hutu and Tutsi were arbitrary and unjustified, this divide
still culminated in the issuance of ethnic identity cards to all Rwandan
citizens in 1933. 37 A person's ethnic classification became determinative
of one's economic and political privilege as well as one's access to
education.38 Racially prejudiced Roman Catholic missionaries were in
charge of schools and helped systematically convey these destructive
values of racial segregation to several generations of Rwandans. 39 This




32. Stettenheim, supra note 14, at 219.
33. See Historical Background, in RWANDA-UNAMIR BACKGROUND,
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/ (follow "Past Operations" to "Africa" to "UNAMIR
(Rwanda)" hyperlink; then follow "Background" hyperlink; then follow "Full Text"
hyperlink; then follow "Historical Background" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 10, 2008)
[hereinafter UNAMIR BACKGROUND].
34. See Gray, supra note 23.
35. See UNAMIR BACKGROUND, supra note 33.
36. See Stettenheim, supra note 14, at 219.
37. See IPEP, supra note 10, at 142.
38. See Stettenheim, supra note 14, at 219.
39. See IPEP, supra note 10, at 142.
40. See id.
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result, a mentality of Tutsi superiority and Hutu resentment developed,4'
and the classification system was eventually used as an instrument in
identifying the Tutsi as targets of the genocide.42
Prior to Rwanda's independence, the Belgians began to relinquish
all governmental powers to the minority Tutsi,43 and until the late 1950s
the Tutsi continued to dominate Rwanda's political and economic
realm. 44 Upon obtaining independence, however, the majority Hutu used
the extreme force of their numbers to gain political control.45 During this
period, ethnicity was the key factor in the struggle for political power.4 6
In 1959, the Hutu came into power and forced many Tutsi to flee
Rwanda and seek refuge in Uganda.47 During this forced exodus, 20,000
Tutsi were killed, and 300,000 fled to safety outside Rwandan borders.48
3. Post Independence
Rwanda gained its independence in 1962 under Hutu rule.49 For
several years, violence continued throughout the country. ° In 1972, in
the neighboring State of Burundi, there was a massacre of the Burundian
Hutu majority by the Tutsi government in retaliation of the Rwandan
Hutu's displacement of the Tutsi. 51 The Burundian Hutu fled to Rwanda
and further expanded the ethnic divide and anti-Tutsi sentiment already
present there.52
Following this massacre, in 1972, Major-General Juvenal
Habyarimana, head of the Rwandan army and a Northern Hutu, came
into power in Rwanda.53 Under Habyarimana's lead, Rwanda began a
period of stability.54 The Tutsi, although still limited in their societal
capacity, felt safe for the first time since the 1950s and thrived in the
public sector.55  During this period, Rwanda experienced economic
success, managing one of the lowest rates of debt in Africa and achieving
41. See Stettenheim, supra note 14, at 219.
42. See IPEP, supra note 10, at 142.
43. See Gray, supra note 23.
44. See UNAMIR BACKGROUND, supra note 33.
45. See Gray, supra note 23.
46. See Stettenheim, supra note 14, at 220.
47. See UNAMIR BACKGROUND, supra note 33.
48. See IPEP, supra note 10, at 143.
49. See UNAMIR BACKGROUND, supra note 33.
50. See Stettenheim, supra note 14, at 220.
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among the highest per capita gross national product rankings within the
56region.
6
By the late 1980s economic progress came to an end, 57 and
Rwanda's position in the international world began to decline. 58 A small
group of insiders, the Akazu, held the main power within the
Habyarimana government. 59 The Akazu, maintaining all power within
the hands of the northern Hutu, were not favored by the southern Hutu.
60
The leaders of the group included President Habyarimana's wife, family
and close associates.61 While the economy of Rwanda took a hard hit,
the Akazu worked to bring the Hutu/Tutsi ethnic divide to the forefront
in an attempt to divert attention away from geographical Hutu
divisions.62
The exiled Tutsi in Uganda organized into a rebel army called the
Rwandan Patriotic Front ("RPF").63 In October 1990, the RPF took
advantage of Rwanda's state of vulnerability and forcefully invaded the
country. 64 Following this attack, close to 300,000 Rwandans, primarily
Hutu, fled from their homes. 65 These Tutsi refugees, now organized as
the RPF, were not welcomed back into Rwanda.66 This attack, coupled
with government anti-Tutsi propaganda, resulted in all Tutsi living
within Rwanda being collectively labeled as allies of the RPF.67
Characterizing even native Tutsi as invaders, all other Rwandans united
against the Tutsi.68 In early 1993, another RPF attack took place that
resulted in another one million Rwandans becoming internally
displaced. 69 Anti-Tutsi violence snowballed, as did RPF attacks against
the Hutu.7
The anti-Tutsi sentiment continued for years.71 Consequently, after
the 1990 RPF invasion, violent attacks against the Tutsi became
commonplace in Rwanda.72 On April 6, 1994, President Habyarimana
56. See Stettenheim, supra note 14, at 221.
57. See IPEP, supra note 10, at 143.
58. See id.
59.' See id. at 144.
60. See Stettenheim, supra note 14, at 220.
61. See IPEP, supra note 10, at 144.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 143.
64. See id.
65. See id. at 144.
66. See IPEP, supra note 10, at 143-144.
67. See UNAMIR BACKGROUND, supra note 33.




72. See id. at 145.
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and the Burundi President, both Hutus, were killed in an airplane
accident.73 The respective leaders were returning from peace talks in
Tanzania concerning the ethnic violence taking place in both countries.74
Suspicion ran high that Hutu extremists from Rwanda caused the
accident because they opposed reconciliation attempts with the Tutsi.75
Following the Presidents' deaths, violence erupted throughout Rwanda,
as the Hutu actively targeted the Tutsi.76 The tragedy that engulfed
Rwanda over the next three months was threefold: "mass murders
throughout the country amounting to genocide; a brief but violent civil
war that swept government forces out of the country; and refugee flows
that created humanitarian and ecological crisis of unprecedented
dimensions. 77
In April 1994, the killing began in Kigali, Rwanda's capital, and
spread throughout the country. 8 The presidential guard did not react
well to Habyarimana's death. 79  They "went on a rampage, killing
supporters of the RPF as well as provisional government members who
might try to succeed the President." 80 Tutsi and "moderate" Hutus were
shot, blown up, hacked to death by machetes, and buried or burned
alive. 81 Eyewitness accounts of these attacks were extensively reported
to the Commission of Experts established by the U.N. Security Council.
82
B. Efforts in Rwanda
1. Initial Regional Response
The initial responses to the Rwandan conflict were regional. These
first responses followed the "summit,,83 approach .84 After the first RPF
73. See April 1994-June 1994, in RWANDA-UNAMIR: BACKGROUND,
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/ (follow "Past Operations" to "Africa" to "UNAMIR
(Rwanda)" hyperlink; then follow "Background" hyperlink; then follow "Full Text"
hyperlink; then follow "April 1994 - June 1994" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 10, 2008)
[hereinafter UNAMIR Apr -June].
74. See On This Day-1994: Rwanda Presidents' Plane 'Shot Down,' BBC NEWS,
Apr. 6, 1994, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/ (search "On This Day-1994: Rwanda
Presidents' Plane"; then follow first hyperlink).
75. See Cold Choices in Rwanda, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1994, at 24.
76. See id.
77. UNAMIR Apr-June, supra note 73.
78. See id.
79. See Paul Lewis, U.N. Chief Asks Rights Aide To Take On a Role in Rwanda,
N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1994, at A9.
80. Id.
81. See UNAMIR Apr-June, supra note 73.
82. See id.
83. A summit consists of heads of state or government coming together to discuss
the matter at hand. In the instant case, several regional summits were held where the
2008]
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
attack in October 1990,85 the initial objective was for a cease-fire
agreement.86 Following a series of regional summits, this agreement was
eventually achieved on March 29, 1991, with the N'sele Cease-fire
Agreement signed by the Government of Rwanda and the RPF.87 This
initial cease-fire agreement, however, was not successful and the
situation in Rwanda intensified.88
Due to worsening conditions, both parties continued to seek a
resolution to the conflict. Between May and June of 1992, the parties
met for talks in Belgium and France. 89 At this time, the President of
Tanzania was appointed to be the neutral facilitator of the negotiations,
and Arusha, Tanzania was chosen as the location for the negotiations. 90
These talks also resulted in a "comprehensive settlement framework" for
the negotiations that would take place in Arusha.91 The parties finalized
the framework in June 1992.92 The biggest challenge left to face was
reaching agreement between both parties as to how best to implement the
framework.93
2. Arusha
The negotiations in Arusha began in July 1992.94 Two days after
opening negotiations, a second ceasefire agreement was signed. 95 Both
parties were aware that for negotiations to proceed, a ceasefire must be in
place.96 The Organization of African Unity ("A.U.") was responsible for
monitoring the parties' compliance with this new cease-fire agreement.
97
leaders of neighboring countries sought a solution to the ethnic divide that was taking
place in Rwanda. See Ami R. Mpungwe, Crises and Response in Rwanda: Reflections on
the Arusha Peace Process, in WHITHER PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA?, (Mark Malan ed.,
1999), http://www.iss.co.za/ (follow "Conflict Management" hyperlink; then under
"Documents" follow "01 Apr 1999: Monograph 36: Whither Peacekeeping in Africa?,
Edited by Mark Malan; then follow "Crisis and Response in Rwanda" hyperlink) (last
visited Feb. 10, 2008).
84. See id.
85. See Stettenheim, supra note 14, at 221.





91. See Mpungwe, supra note 83 (explaining that the "comprehensive settlement
framework" contained a detailed roadmap for the entire negotiation process and set forth





96. See Mpungwe, supra note 83.
97. See id.
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On August 4, 1993, thirteen months after the talks commenced, the
Arusha negotiations finally came to a close with the signing of the
Arusha Peace Agreement ("Arusha Agreement") by President
Habyarimana and the then Chairman of the RPF.98 The Arusha
Agreement contained an amended ceasefire agreement, plans for the
creation of a new rule of law, as well as plans for a transitional
government and parliament. 99 The Arusha Agreement additionally
provided for the return of refugees and internally displaced persons and
the creation of a nationally unified army. 00 "At that stage, the Arusha
peace process was heralded as Africa's most strategic and successful
response to an African conflict to date. It was one of those rare
occasions when an African conflict was seen to have been resolved in
Africa by African people themselves."'' 1
The negotiation process relieved the parties involved, and
consequently the different ethnic groups, of fear, distrust, and hatred. 102
Spending adequate time and dealing with every detail of the conflict
accomplished this relief. 0 3 Accordingly, for the Arusha Agreement to
succeed, close adherence was crucial for preserving the fragile new trust
between the parties.1
0 4
The Arusha Agreement was well thought out, taking into account all
of the details and history at the root of the conflict. 0 5 However, the
negotiations did not leave the parties on completely equal footing.
10 6
While the RPF and the Government of Rwanda ("Government") were the
key parties involved, the Government was disjointed with opposing
members within its own party. 07 The Government was thus in a weaker
position because it had to negotiate with the members of its own party in
addition to the RPF. 0 8  In contrast, the RPF was a single unified
group. 10 9 The sensitive nature of the negotiations further emphasized
that the post-negotiations phase needed to be dealt with carefully and
with much oversight." l0 Joel Stettenheim captured the uncertainty and
danger of the post-negotiations phase best when he said...
98. See Rwanda Independent Inquiry, supra note 11, at 6.
99. See Stettenheim, supra note 14, at 229.
100. See id.









110. See Mpungwe, supra note 83.
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The Arusha Accords stand as a testament to the strength of and the
implicit danger represented by third-party intervention. They
indicate that even the most carefully crafted resolution is not
complete until implemented. They also underscore the deep
responsibility of third parties to maintain their full commitment once
having accepted the burden of involvement. Especially for small
countries, the international community has the power to dramatically
alter the course of events. International powers must remain fully
cognizant that partial efforts are likely worse than no efforts at all. 1
3. The First U.N. Mission
Rwanda's assertion that Uganda supported the RPF and Uganda's
denial of this accusation, resulted in both countries asking for U.N.
assistance on February 22, 1993.112 Both countries sought a U.N.
presence along their border to monitor and prevent the transportation of
military supplies. 113  On June 22, 1993, Security Council Resolution
846' 14 authorized the establishment of the United Nations Observer
Mission Uganda-Rwanda ("UNOMUR") to provide a presence on the
Ugandan side of the border.1 15 The primary purpose of the mission was
to monitor lethal weapons and ammunition transportation across the
border.1 1 6 Eighty-one observers were deployed to Uganda by the end of
September 1993.117
4. The U.N. Takes the Lead
Through the strong support of the A.U., all parties within Rwanda
came to a peaceful agreement in August 1993.118 The Arusha Agreement
also resulted in a working relationship between the A.U. and the U.N.
and a view favoring the cooperation of the international community.
119
The signing of the Arusha Agreement set forth an expansive role for the
U.N. in establishing peace within Rwanda. 120  The plan for attaining
111. Stettenheim, supra note 14, at 236.
112. See United Nations Involvement, in RWANDA-UNAMIR: BACKGROUND,
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/ (follow "Past Operations" to "Africa" to "UNAMIR
(Rwanda)" hyperlink; then follow "Background" hyperlink; then follow "Full Text"
hyperlink; then follow "United Nations Involvement" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 10,
2008) [hereinafter UNAMIR UN Involvement].
113. See id.
114. S.C. Res. 846, U.N. Doc. S/RES/846 (June 22, 1993).
115. See UNAMIR UN Involvement, supra note 112.
116. See S.C. Res. 846, supra note 114, 3.
117. See UNAMIR UN Involvement, supra note 112.
118. See Mpungwe, supra note 83.
119. See id.
120. See Rwanda Independent Inquiry, supra note 11, at 6.
[Vol. 27:2
U.N. PEACEKEEPING AFTER RWANDA
peace was well laid out and its success was dependent upon maintaining
the trust and confidence instilled in both parties during the negotiation
process.121
The U.N. was given the role of establishing the necessary
environment within Rwanda so that the Arusha Agreement could be
successfully implemented.1 22  In order to achieve this, the U.N. was
responsible for deploying the necessary military and civilian personnel to
ensure compliance with the Arusha Agreement and the agreed upon time
schedule. 23 On October 5, 1993, Security Council Resolution 872124
established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
("UNAMIR") in an effort to assist in the implementation of the Arusha
Agreement.1 25 This peacekeeping operation was to be in effect for a
period of six months and was subject to an extension only after review
by the Security Council.1 26  The mandate of UNAMIR included:
contributing to the security of the City of Kigali; 127 monitoring
observance of the cease-fire agreement; 128 monitoring the security
situation during the final period of the transitional government's
mandate;1 29 assisting with mine clearance; 130 investigating instances of
alleged non-compliance with the provisions of the Arusha Agreement;
131
monitoring repatriation of Rwandan refugees;1 32 assisting in the
coordination of humanitarian assistance activities; 133 and investigating
and reporting on incidents regarding activities of the gendarmerie1 34 and
police.
135
The UNAMIR was to be instituted in four phases. 36 The initial
phase involved assisting in the implementation of a transitional
government to be in effect until a permanent government could be
established. 37 Phase One was targeted for completion in late 1993, and
121. See Mpungwe, supra note 83.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. S.C. Res. 872, U.N. Doc. S/RES/872 (Oct. 5, 1993).
125. See id. 2.
126. See id.
127. See id. 3(a).
128. See id. 3(b).
129. See S.C. Res. 872, supra note 124, 3(c).
130. See id. 3(d).
131. Seeid. 3(e).
132. See id. 3(f).
133. See id. 3(g).
134. Gendarmerie is a derivative from the French language and constitutes a body of
police. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 520 (Frederick C. Mish, ed.,
Merriam-Webster, Inc. 11 th ed. 2007) (2003).
135. See S.C. Res. 872, supra note 124, 3(h).
136. See UNAMIR UN Involvement, supra note 112.
137. See id.
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would result in a deployment of 1,428 military personnel.1 38 This would
transition into Phase Two, which was anticipated to last ninety days.
1 39
This second phase aimed to ensure disengagement, demobilization and
integration of all parties to the conflict and would result in a total
deployment of 2,548 military personnel. 40 Phase Three, anticipated to
last nine months, called for a reduction of military personnel to 1,240 as
the disengagement, demobilization and integration of all parties would be
completed. 14 1 Military personnel would be further reduced to 930 during
Phase Four, where UNAMIR, within four months, would secure the final
stages of the transitional government before elections.1
42
5. What Went Wrong?
With a detailed agreement in place and the international community
agreeing to fulfill their necessary roles, Rwanda should have been on the
path to peace and stability. However, several factors, both internal and
external, prevented the successful implementation of the Arusha
Agreement. 43  The U.N., having been designated as the primary
peacekeeping organization during the immediate post-negotiations phase,
was essentially unsuccessful in its duty to provide the requisite security
and stability that was needed immediately following the negotiation
process. 144
The U.N. was cognizant of the severity of the situation in Rwanda,
with discussions taking place as early as April 1993 concerning whether
the human rights violations that had already taken place amounted to
genocide. 145 Yet, the U.N.'s mistakes began as early as the establishment
of the UNAMIR when it was not given the full attention and resources
necessary to deal with the actual severity of the situation. 46  When
drafting the original mandate establishing the UNAMIR, the U.N.
Secretary-General recommended a more expansive U.N. role, but the




141. See UNAMIR UNInvolvement, supra note 112.
142. See id.
143. See Stettenheim, supra note 14, at 232. Though many factors contributed to the
failure of peacekeeping efforts in Rwanda, the scope of this Comment deals strictly with
U.N. actions.
144. See id.
145. See Rwanda Independent Inquiry, supra note 11, at 6.
146. See Stettenheim, supra note 14, at 233.
147. See Rwanda Independent Inquiry, supra note 11, at 8.
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was for the U.N. to assist in arms recovery. 148  Yet, the mandate
proscribed that the parties were to provide a weapons free area within
which the U.N. would work, rather than the U.N. assisting in the
efforts. 149 This proved to be a crucial mistake and thus, the UNAMIR
mandate itself did not adequately provide for the task that the U.N. had
agreed to accomplish. 150 In addition, from the inception of the mandate,
sufficient resources and logistics were not allocated. 15' When the
genocide started, six months subsequent to the creation of the UNAMIR,
these logistical problems had not been remedied and thus the U.N. was
by no means equipped to handle the unfolding events. 152 These initial
problems were the starting point for many mistakes that followed.
The UNAMIR was further flawed in several respects. 153 The U.N.
Security Council did not perceive the mission as being at the level of
complexity that it deserved. 154 This led to the grant of a much smaller
presence in Rwanda than the negotiations in Arusha had requested.
55
This initial underestimation left the UNAMIR too weak to effectively
deal with the escalating violent situation.156 Further, though the U.N.
Security Council was continuously informed of the reality of what was
indeed taking place, no expansion of the UNAMIR mandate was granted
until well into the genocide. 57 By the time the genocide ended, the
newly approved forces had yet to arrive.
158
While the mass media did not well publicize the atrocities that were
unfolding in Rwanda, governments and international agencies were not
lacking in first hand reports of exactly what was taking place. 159 Yet,
instead of heeding the warnings of organizations such as the International
Committee for the Red Cross, Human Rights Watch, and the U.S.
Committee for Refugees along with others, and instead of following
steps advised to save lives, as time passed the U.N. mistakenly reduced
its presence. 160 The appropriate response to these reports should have




151. Seeid. at 39.
152. See Rwanda Independent Inquiry, supra note 11, at 41.
153. See infra notes 153-71 and accompanying text.
154. See Rwanda Independent Inquiry, supra note 11, at 31.
155. See id. at 30.
156. See id.
157. See UNAMIR Apr - June, supra note 73.
158. See id.
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presence could have significantly mitigated the killings, or possibly
deterred the genocide altogether. 
162
Directly following the April 6, 1994 airplane crash, the UNAMIR
Commander present in Rwanda immediately called U.N. headquarters in
New York, requesting the support necessary to handle the situation.
63
Again, no further support was granted. 164 The lack of power granted
within the UNAMIR mandate became sadly evident when the genocide
began and the U.N. was unable to even mitigate the circumstances.165
The day after the airplane crash, the UNAMIR Commander again called
U.N. headquarters in New York.166  During this conversation the
UNAMIR Commander was reminded of the rules of engagement and that
U.N. forces could not fire unless fired upon.16 7 This essentially allowed
the genocidaires 168 to attack at will, as long as it was not directed at U.N.
personnel. 1
69
"There are strong arguments that a robust response by the
international community could have stopped the killings before they
spread throughout the country. What happened instead was that the
[U.N.], after having insisted on unilateral control, simply withdrew."
' 70
Within the first few days of the genocide, Rwanda was clearly in need of
significant assistance, yet as early as April 9, 1994, discussions took
place concerning completely withdrawing the UNAMIR rather than
effectively dealing with the intensifying situation. 171  The U.N.
peacekeeping efforts in Rwanda exemplified a lack of will to follow
through with their commitment. 1
72
While the presence of [U.N.] peacekeepers in Rwanda may have
begun as a traditional peacekeeping operation to monitor the
implementation of an existing peace agreement, the onslaught of the
genocide should have led decision-makers in the [U.N.] ... to realize
that the original mandate, and indeed the neutral mediating role of the
[U.N.], was no longer adequate and required a different, more




163. See id. at 189.
164. See IPEP, supra note 10, at 189.
165. See Rwanda Independent Inquiry, supra note 11, at 36.
166. See IPEP, supra note 10, at 189.
167. See id.
168. The genocidaires are those responsible for carrying out the genocide.
169. See IPEP, supra note 10, at 189.
170. Stettenheim, supra note 14, at 236.
171. See Rwanda Independent Inquiry, supra note 11, at 36.
172. See id. at 39.
173. Id. at 50-51.
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III. THE CONFLICT IN DARFUR
"The [U.N.] considers the Darfur conflict to be one of the world's
worst humanitarian crises."'174 The U.N. estimated that, as of January
2005, approximately 1.65 million people have been internally displaced
in Darfur, Sudan, and over 200,000 have fled to Chad as refugees.
75
Throughout the conflict, there has been large-scale destruction of
villages. 176  A U.N. Commission found that government forces and
militias have carried out widespread and systematic attacks involving the
killing of civilians, torture, destruction of villages, rape and pillaging,
and forced displacement throughout the region of Darfur.
177
A. Historical Background of the Conflict
1. The Sudan-North v. South
The Sudan is the largest country in Africa, having an estimated
population of thirty-nine million people. 178 Sudan is made up of twenty-
five states with Khartoum being the capital. 179 There is a prominent
distinction between the North, where Islam is the predominant religion
and the South, where Christianity and animist traditional religions are
more prevalent.!80 A multitude of tribes are existent within the country
and have developed more than 130 languages and dialects. 81 The U.N.
considers the Sudan to be a Least Developed Country,1 82 with no
adequate national road system and all but two regions largely
marginalized and neglected, including Darfur.
1 83
174. UNMIS.org, Darfur and the Peacebuilding, http://www.unmis.org/enlglish/en-
main.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2008).
175. See Int'l Comm'n of Inquiry on Darfur, Report of the International Commission
of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General, p. 3, U.N. Doc. S/2005/60
(Feb. 1, 2005) [herinafter Inquiry on Darfur].
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. See id. at 18.
179. See CIA, The World Factbook, available at https://www.cia.gov/ (from
"Library" link follow "Publications"; then follow "The World Factbook" hyperlink; then
from "select a country or location" choose "Sudan").
180. See Inquiry on Darfur, supra note 175, at 18.
181. See id.
182. The U.N. classifies countries as Least Developed Countries ("LDC") based upon
three criteria: a low-income criterion, a human resource weakness criterion, and an
economic vulnerability criterion. A country classified as a LDC must satisfy each of the
three criteria. See UN-OHRILLS, The Criteria for the identification of the LDCs
http://www.un.org/special-rep/ohrlls/ldc/ldc%20criteria.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2008).
183. See Inquiry on Darfur, supra note 175, at 18.
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In January 1956, the Sudan gained its independence.' 84 Since that
time, the country has fluctuated between democratic rule and military
regimes coming to power through coups d'Otat.'85 In 1956, General
Ibrahim Abbud came to power and advocated for the spread of Islam
throughout the country. 186 The Southern region did not welcome this
change and in 1963 an armed rebellion materialized. 87  The social
climate throughout the country worsened, causing Abbud to resign
within a year of coming to power, leaving a transitional government in
effect.' 88
Colonel Gaffar Mohamed Al-Nimeiri gained power in 1969 and
signed an agreement with rebels from the South to establish the region's
autonomy in 1972.189 Following this, the country was at peace for eleven
years. 90 However, near the end of Nimeiri's rule, oil was discovered in
the South. 19 1 Nimeiri implemented measures to ensure that the North
benefited from the South's oil and once again introduced Islamic rule.
192
In 1983, these actions resulted in the beginning of the second war with
the South. 193 Nimeiri was overthrown within two years. 194 After a brief
transitional period, Sadiq Al-Mahdi was elected Prime Minister, with his
government lasting less than four years. 195  The war in the South
continued and Sudan's problems with drought and desertification caused
further frustrations. 1
96
In June 1989, current president, General Omar Hassan El-Bashir,
came into power. 197 Like Nimeiri, El-Bashir's devotion to Islamic rule
brought significant changes to Sudan's legal and judicial systems.'
98
Throughout El-Bashir's rule, internal power struggles resulted in great
instability within the government.199
This conflict between Northern and Southern Sudan, which erupted
in 1983, is the longest conflict involving human rights abuses in African
184. See id. at 19.
185. See id. A coups d'6tat is a violent, illegal overthrow of a present power in order
to becomes its successor.
186. See id.
187. See id.










198. See Inquiry on Darfur, supra note 175, at 19.
199. See id. at 20.
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history. 200 The conflict resulted in the deaths of over two million people
and the displacement of an additional 4.5 million. 0 The Sudanese
Government and the main southern rebel group, Sudan People's
Liberation Movement/Army ("SPLM/A"), began peace talks in 2002.202
2. Darfur
Darfur is located in the western part of the Sudan and has an
estimated population of six million people.20 3 Since 1994, the region has
been divided into three administrative states: the North, South, and
West. 204 A governor runs each state and is supported by a local
administration.20 5 Various tribal groups are present in the region.20 6
There are distinctions that exist between these groups, and while these
distinctions are not completely understood, they become more
pronounced during times of conflict.20 7 Predominantly agriculturalist
and sedentary tribes subsist on crop production while nomadic and semi-
nomadic tribes subsist on cattle and camel herding.20 8
Land has long been an issue in the politics of Darfur. °9
Traditionally, land ownership was communal and the nomadic tribes
peacefully moved through the lands of other tribes.2 '0  Disputes that
arose were settled peacefully through traditional law. 21 1 However, in the
1970s, the alteration of land laws allowed individual ownership of
land.212 Also, under President Nimeiri's rule, new local administrative
structures were established and the tribal system was no longer
recognized.2 3 The State was once a neutral mediator in disputes, but
with this new system of governance, this neutrality diminished.214
In addition to tribal conflicts over land, improved access to weapons
further exasperated tribal disputes.215 Major tribes and certain villages













212. See id. at 22.
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protect their interests.216 These tribal tensions sparked rebel movements
of great popularity within Darfur.217
Two main rebel groups emerged in Darfur: the Sudan Liberation
Movement/Army ("SLM/A") and the Justice and Equality Movement
("JEM").218 These two groups were in essence made of three tribes: The
Fur, the Massalit, and the Zaghawa. 219 Throughout 2001 and 2002, these
groups organized themselves in opposition to the Khartoum
Government. 220  Both groups' reasons for rebellion were centered on
socio-economic and political marginalization of Darfur and its people.221
Each group had a clear political agenda that involved all of Sudan.
222
They demanded equal participation by all groups and regions of the
Sudan.223
The SLM/A, formerly known as the Darfur Liberation Front,
initially focused on the people of Darfur, but later broadened its
initiatives to cover all of Sudan.224 The SLM/A seeks a "united
democratic Sudan" as well as the separation of church and state.
2 25
Meanwhile, JEM focuses on proving that there are disparities in the
distribution of power and wealth.226 JEM points out that Darfur, as well
as other regions, has been routinely marginalized and not sufficiently
included in the central government of Khartoum. 7 Neither movement
has a tribal perspective, but rather, works on behalf of all of Darfur and
primarily directs attacks at the Khartoum.228
The rebel groups first began military activity in late 2002 and early
2003.229 They began with attacks directed at local police offices. 30
Their goal was to loot government property and weaponry.231  The
Sudanese Government was in the process of peace negotiations with the
SPLM/A, and while it does not appear that the rebellion was taken as a
216. See id.
217. See id.
218. See Inquiry on Darfur, supra note 175, at 23.




223. See Inquiry on Darfur, supra note 175, at 24.
224. See id.
225. See id. at 38.
226. See id. at 24.
227. See id.
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serious military matter, these circumstances left the government in a
position of being unable to retaliate.232
In March and April of 2003, rebel groups killed many soldiers and
destroyed several military aircraft in a surprise attack .33  The
Government's position further worsened because rebels had been looting
government weaponry.234 After rebel attacks at government posts in
Darfur, the Government withdrew forces and no longer had control over
areas where rebels were based.235 To deal with these rebel threats, the
Government sought assistance in fighting from local tribes. 236  This
assistance further aggravated the existing tension between the Darfur
tribes. 237 The government funded tribal leaders, giving them gifts based
23on their ability to recruit support for the government. 38 Newly recruited
fighters came to be labeled the "Janjaweed. '239
"Janjaweed" generally means "a man (a devil) on a horse., 240 The
term "Janjaweed" within the Darfur conflict has been described "as a
generic term to describe Arab militia acting, under the authority, with the
support, complicity or tolerance of the Sudanese State authorities, who
benefit from impunity for their actions., 241 The Janjaweed have been
reported as making their attacks on horseback or camelback.242 While
not thought to be a large group, due to government assistance, the
Janjaweed are well armed with automatic weapons.243 "They have killed,
raped, maimed, looted and burned down tens of thousands of village
homes, displacing hundreds of thousands of people.,
244
232. See id. (explaining that it is possible that since the SPLM/A had utilized such
violence and were then taking part in fruitful negotiations that were rapidly advancing
that the Darfur rebel groups took this as a lesson that armed conflict would give them the
same results).
233. See Inquiry on Darfur, supra note 175, at 24.
234. See id.
235. See id. at 25.
236. See id.
237. See id.
238. See Inquiry on Darfur, supra note 175, at 25.
239. See id.
240. Id. at 31.
241. Id. at 34.
242. See id.
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B. Steps Towards Peace
1. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement
Throughout the twenty-one year conflict that ensued in Sudan, there
were many attempts to establish peace.245 External organizations,
including neighboring states, as well as the parties involved, facilitated
attempts to end the conflict. 246 Many factors, however, including the
complexities of the situation and lack of political will, prevented a
resolution to the conflict.
247
The Heads of State of the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought
and Development ("IGADD") became involved in 1993.248 With the
help of IGADD, a long process began, which in 2005 resulted in the
signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. 249 The Comprehensive
Peace Agreement is a series of six agreements that first call for a
ceasefire and then establish principles of governance and lay a
framework for the transitional process of achieving these principles.25° It
was through the help of the Inter-Governmental Authority on
Development ("IGAD"), 251 that the Government of Sudan and the
SPLM/A achieved the signing of the agreements.252 The IGAD was also
responsible for the U.N. becoming involved in the peace process.253 The
U.N. was represented at summit meetings of IGAD countries and partook
in consultations with regional players in furtherance of the peace
process.254
2. United Nations' Efforts in Sudan
On June 11, 2004, Security Resolution 1547255 established the
United Nations Advance Mission in Sudan ("UNAMIS") with the
purpose of assisting in the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement signed by the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A. 6 On
245. See UNMIS.org, Comprehensive Peace Agreement, http://ummis.org/english/





250. See UNMIS CPA, supra note 245.
251. The IGAD superseded the IGADD in 1966. See IGAD.org, About IGAD,
http://igad.org/ (follow "About IGAD" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 10, 2008).
252. See UNMIS CPA, supra note 245.
253. See id.
254. See id.
255. S.C. Res. 1547, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1547 (June 11, 2004).
256. See id. 1.
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March 24, 2005, Security Resolution 1590257 later changed the name to
the United Nations Mission in Sudan ("UNMIS").2 5' The purpose of the
UNMIS is to help in maintaining peaceful operations during the interim
period following the signing and during the implementation of the
259Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
3. United Nations Extends Assistance to Darfur
On July 30, 2004, through U.N. Security Resolution 1556,260 the
UNAMIS was expanded to create a focus specifically on Darfur.26' Due
to the initiatives of the African Union and the support of the U.N., as
well as other participants, the Darfur Peace Agreement was then signed
on May 5, 2006.262 The signatories to the agreement were the SLM/A
and the Sudanese Government. 263  The agreement addresses Darfur's
history of marginalization and establishes a plan to initiate democratic
processes for the people of Darfur.264 The agreement called for the
disarmament and demobilization of the Janjaweed militia to have taken
place by October 2006.265
On August 31, 2006, U.N. Security Resolution 1706266 extended the
mandate of the UNMIS to help in the region of Darfur by assisting in the
implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement.267 This Agreement
established a three-phased approach to strengthen the African Union
Mission in Sudan ("AMIS") and deploy an unprecedented A.U./U.N.
Hybrid peacekeeping force in Darfur.268  The U.N.'s three-phased
approach consisted of a Light Support Package ("LSP"), a Heavy
Support Package ("HSP"), and the A.U./U.N. Hybrid operation in Darfur
("UNAMID"). 269 The LSP had mostly been deployed by the end of July,
2007, and primarily provided support to the management capacity of the
257. S.C. Res. 1590, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1 590 (Mar. 24, 2005).
258. See id. 1.
259. See id. 4.
260. S.C. Res. 1556, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1556 (July 30, 2004).
261. See Press Release, U.N. Sec. Council, Security Council Demands Sudan Disarm
Militias in Darfur, U.N. Doc. SC/8160 (July 30, 2004).
262. See Darfur: UNAMID: Background, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/
(follow "Current Operations" to "Africa" to "UNAMID (Darfur, Sudan)" hyperlink; then
follow "Background" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 10, 2008) [hereinafter UNAMID
Background].




266. S.C. Res. 1796, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1706 (Aug. 31, 2006).
267. See id. 1.
268. See UNAMID Background, supra note 262.
269. See id.
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AMIS. 270 The HSP, meant to be deployed in mid to late 2007, was
designed to provide the AMIS with transitional support until the greater
Hybrid operation could be deployed.27'
In June 2007, Sudan accepted the A.U./U.N. Hybrid operation and
on July 31, 2007, the UNAMID was officially established by U.N.
Security Resolution 1769.272 Under Resolution 1769, the UNAMID is
273authorized for an initial period of twelve months. The mission allows
for approximately 20,000 troops, over 6,000 police, and a significant
civilian presence.274 The UNAMID was to have management, command,
and control structures in place, as well as operational command over the
LSP, the HSP, and AMIS by the end of 2007.275 Upon establishment of
the UNAMID, a goal was set for implementing the initial phase no later
that December 31, 2007.276
4. Progress of UNAMID
Though the UNAMID achieved its goal of taking over the LSP, the
HSP, and the existing A.U. operation, other components of the mission
faced problems.277 As of the end of December 2007, the requisite
aviation and transportation units to allow for successful implementation
of the mission had not yet been acquired. 278 This shortfall could have a
significant impact on the progress of the mission, given the need for
rapid mobility and the poor infrastructure of the region. 279 As of the
beginning of January 2008, months after the establishment of the
UNAMID, only 9,000 troops were put in place.280 This falls short of the
anticipated deployment by more than 11,000 troops.28'
270. See id.
271. See id.
272. S.C. Res. 1769, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1769 (July 31, 2007); see also UNAMID
Background, supra note 262.
273. See UNAMID Background, supra note 262.
274. See id.
275. See id.
276. See Darfur: UNAMID: Facts and Figures, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/
(follow "Current Operations" to "Africa" to "UNAMID (Darfur, Sudan)" hyperlink; then
follow "Facts and Figures" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 10, 2008).
277. See Outstanding gaps in new UN force in Darfur must be filled, UN NEWS
SERVICE, Jan. 3, 2008, available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewslD =
25202&Cr-Darfur&Crl =.
278. See Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the deployment of the
African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, 16, U.N. Doc. S/2007/759,
(Dec. 24, 2007) [hereinafter Hybrid].
279. See id.
280. See source cited supra note 277.
281. See id.
[Vol. 27:2
U.N. PEACEKEEPING AFTER RWANDA
The period from October to December 2007, saw an increase in
violence within the region of Darfur.282 Armed clashes continued to take
place during this period between Darfur movements and the Government
of the Sudan.283 Though the mandate of the UNAMID remains in effect,
progress within Darfur has been modest.284 While the circumstances
within the region worsen, the UNAMID must start its operations with
limited capabilities and resources.285
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Changes in the U.N. Approach to Peacekeeping
A number of lessons should have been learned from the tragedy that
took place in Rwanda. First, when approaching conflicts with such deep
roots of political and social tension, a great deal of seriousness needs to
be placed on the mission. In Rwanda, the U.N. often underestimated the
seriousness of the conflict and its potential for a disastrous outcome.
286
Therefore, the peacekeeping mission did not proceed with the sensitivity
and strength required for success. Second, the U.N. should have learned
that a key factor in dealing with such sensitive situations is that
established plans need to be strictly adhered to in a timely manner. The
parties involved in these conflicts become strongly dependent upon equal
compliance with the agreements reached between the parties. 287 When
deadlines are missed, parties can become uneasy and the effects of this
can be disastrous. Further, the U.N. needs to prepare for setbacks in their
progress and must have the supplies and strength to immediately calm
deviations that could arise. In Rwanda, the U.N.'s mandate was flawed
from its inception.288 However, upon realizing this as the situation
worsened, problems could have been remedied. Adjustments could have
been made to the mandate allowing surges of troops and supplies to be
immediately instituted to mitigate the violence.
The situation in Darfur mirrors that of Rwanda in many respects.289
Some positive changes, however, have taken place. In both Rwanda and
Darfur, negotiations towards a peace agreement were overseen by
regional actors with the U.N. taking only a nominal role, rather than
282. See Hybrid, supra note 278, 40.
283. See id. 40-41.
284. See id. 66.
285. See id. 47.
286. See supra notes 145-46, 154-69 and accompanying text.
287. See supra notes 102-10 and accompanying text.
288. See supra notes 146-52 and accompanying text.
289. See supra Parts II.B.4, III.B.
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administering the negotiations altogether.29° In Rwanda, after the
negotiations came to a close, the U.N. took on the role of peacekeeping
unilaterally. Efforts in Darfur proved promising, in that the
peacekeeping role is a joint effort between the U.N. and the A.U.
291
Further, the U.N.'s most recent mandate in Darfur called for a drastic
increase in troops over the number deployed in Rwanda.292
B. Predictions for Darfur
The U.N. is approaching a critical period in terms of its eventual
success or failure in Darfur. Though positive changes have been made in
the U.N.'s efforts in Darfur as compared to Rwanda, we are also seeing
many of the same mistakes.293 The U.N. and Sudan agreed to allow for a
strong peacekeeping force. As the U.N. enters the third and strongest
phase of its mission, problems are already starting to occur. Darfur has
yet to see the promised number of troops and key aviation and
transportation units scheduled to have been in place have thus far not
arrived. If the U.N. can act hastily to remedy their shortages in promised
support, the outcome for Darfur could be much more positive. A strong
peacekeeping presence might curb the escalating violence and save lives.
To accomplish this, significant actions must be taken immediately to
bring the mission back on track with its mandate. If the U.N. is unable to
pull its forces together in these early, critical weeks, it is likely that the
severity of the situation could intensify and the U.N. will find itself in a
situation of yet again294 being inadequately equipped to maintain control
and thus, we could see a downward spiraling of events that are all too
familiar given the tragedy that engulfed Rwanda.
V. CONCLUSION
The U.N. continually takes on the role of peacekeeping during times
of conflict around the world. Given the importance of this task and the
impact it can have on uncountable lives, mistakes cannot be afforded.
Yet, when mistakes are made; are lessons learned and thus corrections
made in the future? Reflecting upon the tragedy that engulfed Rwanda,
though certain lessons have been learned, sadly, similar, disastrous
mistakes are also being made.
290. See supra notes 83-101, 248-54, 260-62 and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes 267-68 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 136-42, 272-74 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 268-85 and accompanying text.
294. See supra notes 165-69 and accompanying text.
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